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Introduction
This essay explores some of the problems
involved in using Western theoretical models to
explain the process of social and cultural change in
post-Communist countries. Up to now sociologists
from the newly independent states have not
generally offered theoretical analyses of the
societies they inhabit, preferring instead to present
work with a purely descriptive character. There is,
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Santrauka. Straipsnyje nagrinëjamos Vakarø teorijø panaudojimo problemos aiðkinant socialinius ir kultûrinius
pokyèius postkomunistinëse visuomenëse. Viena vertus, tokiø teorijø panaudojimas yra grindþiamas ðiø visuomeniø vystymosi
link Vakarø iðsivysèiusiø postindustriniø visuomeniø modelio tendencija, kita vertus, teigiama, kad dël skirtingo konteksto,
kuriame buvo sukurtos ðios teorijos, jos vargu ar gali paaiðkinti postkomunistiniø visuomeniø raidos savitumus.
Vienas labiausiai diskutuojamø – viduriniosios klasës probleminis aspektas, kai daþnai kalbama apie viduriniosios
klasës trûkumà ar silpnumà postkomunistinëse ðalyse. Ðis diskursas tampa ypaè politizuotas, kai susiejami viduriniosios
klasës vystymosi ir demokratijos stiprinimo veiksniai, teigiant, kad vidurinioji klasë yra bûtina sàlyga stabiliai demokratijai
sukurti. Todël kyla klausimas, kiek viduriniosios klasës sàvoka gali paaiðkinti pokyèiø procesà ðiose visuomenëse? Ar tai tik
‘atsilikimo’ metafora lyginant jas su iðsivysèiusiomis Vakarø visuomenëmis?
Straipsnyje yra argumentuojama, kad viduriniosios klasës susiejimas su stabilia demokratija kelia rûpesèiø ir Vakarø
teoretikams, nes daþnai tas stabilumas remiasi ne tiek demokratinës politinës sistemos palaikymu, kiek nenoru keisti esamà
situacijà, siekiant apsaugoti savo ekonominius, statuso ar vartotojiðkus interesus. Be to, toks susiejimas nepaaiðkina ir
ðiuolaikiniø industriniø visuomeniø, kuriose vyrauja vidurinysis visuomenës sluoksnis, o taip pat polinkio á ksenofobijà,
rasizmà ir kitus, su demokratija nederanèius, reiðkinius.
Postkomunistiniø ðaliø atveju, importuojant vakarietiðkame kontekste suformuotà viduriniosios klasës sàvokà,
susiduriama su akivaizdþiais sunkumais. Visø pirma ði sàvoka turi silpnà aiðkinamàjà galià, nes empirinis viduriniosios
klasës nebuvimo ar silpnumo konstatavimas nieko reikðmingo nepasako apie vykstanèiø procesø savitumus ar demokratijos
vystymàsi. Be to, vyraujantis orientavimasis á vakarietiðkus teorinius modelius remiasi tyrimø finansavimu (daþnai –Vakarø
fondø) ir labai susiaurina tyrimø tematikà, kai lieka neaptartos daug svarbesnës visuomenës problemos. Negana to, tokios
sàvokos, kaip ‘vidurinioji klasë’, ,vartotojiðka visuomenë’ ar ‘pilietinë visuomenë’ tampa ne teorinëmis priemonëmis,
padedanèiomis aiðkinti socialinæ realybæ, bet ideologiniais artefaktais, áteisinanèiais ekonominius ar politinius interesus.
Tokie negatyvûs Vakarø teoriniø modeliø taikymo skirtinguose kontekstuose aspektai ákvepia poreiká ieðkoti labiau tinkamø
teoriniø prielaidø ir sàvokø, galinèiø paaiðkinti  vykstanèius pokyèius.
however, an increasing tendency or them to use, or
rather to strain, Western models in examining local
conditions. This approach has often been justified
by the view that societies emerging from the collapse
of the Communist regimes are following the path
of Western countries in terms, for example, of the
development of democratic governments and
market economies.
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Given this, the argument goes, sociological
theories, which were originally intended to account
for the characteristics of the latter may adequately
serve as a conceptual blueprint for those seeking to
explain social phenomena in the former. Yet such
works and theories were developed for very
different, and relatively stable, social environments,
like Britain or France, and in seeking to sustain a
coherent argument, sociologists applying them to,
say, Eastern Europe risk overlooking the particu-
larities and diverse cultural patterns found across
Western and Eastern European contexts. Moreover,
the strong tendency now for Western perspectives
to set research agendas for sociological inquiries in
the post-Communist world may produce a false, if
comforting, view of the real social situation.
That Western sociological concepts have
become so fashionable in post-Communist intellec-
tual discourse has had a profound impact on
research grant and publishing opportunities, and
thus on academic career trajectories. Politically and
ideologically coloured topics are now the focus of
attention, leading sponsors to support the analysis
of such topics at the expense of other equally
pressing, though perhaps less effectively marketed,
issues. In this way certain issues have practically
been ruled out as subjects for academic study and
for the moment have little chance of receiving
further critical attention.
I would like to illustrate some of these points
by inquiring into the applicability in the context of
rapidly changing societies of the cluster of concepts
centring about the Western notion of the ‘middle
class’. In the post-Communist world, this notion is
perhaps at its most politically charged when it is
linked with the claim that the development of a
‘middle class’ is a precondition for sustainable,
Western-style democracy.
The concept of the ‘middle class’ and its
ambiguities
The beginnings of the current debate among
post-Communist intellectuals on the issue of the
‘middle class’ go back to the very start of the social
transformations brought about by the collapse of
the Soviet Union. The basis for this debate is the
idea that if democracy in changing societies is to be
effective and sustainable, then it must be founded
not only on the institutionalisation of democratic
rule but also on a substantive social group with
manifest pro-capitalist and pro-democratic leanings.
Despite the many political reforms of the past
decade, it seems that support for democracy is
dwindling to the extent that post-Communist
governments promoting democratic values have
met with growing social resistance. In this situation,
the artificial creation in emerging post-Communist
states of a middle class, the character and function
of which are similar to those of the middle class in
previously established Western democratic so-
cieties, is seen as a viable solution.
The idea of newly creating such a group within
the social structure found widespread support
among intellectuals almost immediately after the
revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe. The
belief that the radical renewal of society would
depend on fostering and development of a middle
class drawn from various sectors of post-Communist
society became a cliché of the period, as Peter
Rutland points out: “after the collapse of commu-
nism, it became a cliché to argue that democracy
rests on the shoulders of the middle class and that
the best way to produce such a middle class is to
unleash market reform”  (Rutland 1997; 21). Such
views are hardly specific to post-Communist states;
actually they are apparent in almost all societies
exhibiting tendencies towards the establishment of
democracy. After the Second World War, for
instance, the United States government made the
formation of a middle class a guiding principle for
the reconstruction of the defeated states of Europe
and Japan. A similar call for the creation of a self-
sustaining middle class is frequently being made
today in post-war Iraq in the sincere belief that the
development of such a class will promote the rise
of democratic institutions (Dawisha 2003; 36, 15).
These cases as much as the post-Communist ones
are bound by the use of the same Western model in
terms of a positive relationship between democracy
and the middle class.
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This notion of the middle class as the social
foundation of democracy departs from traditional
Western liberal views, which have their roots in the
Aristotelian notion of democracy as the ideal polity.
Here the middle class prevails as the predominant
group and conforms to the Aristotelian virtue of
the median since it is neither as hungry as the poor
nor as greedy as the rich. Therefore, according to
Aristotle, the middle class is more likely than other
socio-economic groups to possess the necessary
democratic attributes of moderation, tolerance and
patience. An Aristotelian middle class is, as Ronald
Glassman notes, “a middle class carrying legal-
democratic values and able to act as a mediating
class between the rich and the poor” (Glassman
1997; 92).
In practice, of course, the term ‘middle class’
is used to describe the emergence of the modern
bourgeoisie and democratic capitalist societies. The
rise of the bourgeoisie and ‘bourgeois’ notions of
individual autonomy, representation and the free
play of public opinion led to structural changes
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For
Hannes Siegrist, such “new experiences and
discourses allowed the emerging middle class to
criticise existing conditions, conceive of new social
and symbolic orders, and lay claim to leading or
mediating positions as well as to central functions
and competences in society” (Siegrist 2002; 4). So
the bourgeoisie during this early stage of democratic
development played a central role in promoting and
sustaining a new political and social order.
However, in the nineteenth century the bourgeoisie
became a focus for fundamental criticisms based
on notions of political equality and social justice.
By the first half of the twentieth century, as Siegrist
notes, opposition to the class as a whole came from
groups of very different types, ranging from fascists
and cultural conservatives to Communists. The
bourgeoisie was also challenged by progressive and
democratic critics objecting to its “decadence” and
“inability to lead” the democratic reforms of the
time (ibid.; 5).
The decline of the bourgeoisie’s role in
democracy was also influenced by new develop-
ments in capitalism. Intensified industrialisation and
increasing bureaucratisation engendered new
groups – technocratic, bureaucratic, service and
white-collar office workers – who presented them-
selves as supporters of the established order. Daniel
Bell claims that the ‘heart’ of this post-industrial
society is a class whose main capital is no longer its
ownership of property as in the previous stage of
capitalism, but its skills and knowledge attained
through higher education (Bell 1973; 212). Mem-
bers of this new professional class can generate
enough wealth to sustain themselves through the
sale of their labour alone. In this way the old gaps
between workers and the bourgeoisie came to be
filled with a growing number of new groups – which
we now refer to collectively as the ‘new middle class’
in order to distinguish it from older views of the
bourgeoisie.
From the second half of the twentieth century
onwards this new middle class became the dominant
group in almost all Western democratic states in
terms of its size and relative influence on the
direction and dynamics of social development.
Estimates frequently place the new middle class in
the most developed economies at over 50% of the
population (Mokrzycki 1995; 223). The old middle
class has not disappeared, but it has certainly
declined in relative numbers and influence
(Glassman 1997; 92) and has become increasingly
differentiated from the rest of the middle class. It
would seem, then, that the development of
advanced contemporary democracies has largely
been the responsibility of the ‘new middle class’.
Nevertheless, the relation between the new
middle class and democracy is not so unambiguous.
Glassman recalls the pessimistic views of Max
Weber and C. Wright Mills about the erosion of
parliamentary democracy under the pressure of
increased bureaucracy. This process is closely
related to Mills’s warning about the differences of
character and circumstance between the
independent and entrepreneurial old middle class
and the salaried, conformist and bureaucratically
entangled new middle class. He believed that the
new middle class would become locked into the
status hierarchy of one giant bureaucracy or other,
and that they would not be able to exert any inde-
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pendent democratic influence upon the society at
large (Glassman 1997; 93).
Interestingly, very few of the numerous
arguments in post-Communist states for the crucial
role of the middle class in bringing about effective
democracy make any distinction between the old
and new middle class. In current discourse the
middle class is mainly associated with property
ownership and it is perhaps for this very reason that
a positive correlation between the group and
support for democracy prevails. If an effective
democracy rests on a middle class base, on a mass
of property-owners, it is because of the following
three main arguments.
The first argument is the assumption that social
inequalities, if permitted to grow, would result in
injustice and become a danger to democracy. For
example, Bloom and others following him claim that
the larger and stronger the middle class, the more
stable society becomes. In this view, the creation of
the state as a system means first of all the
enlargement, maintenance and strengthening of the
middle class, which may then act as a buffer
preventing the gap between the elite and the masses
from becoming so wide that it threatens the stability
of society. Here the political elite must seek to
protect the middle class for the sake of the state
(Blom 1995; 18). A similar line of argument can be
also found in the works of post-Communist
researchers. Henrik Domanski, for instance, claims
that “because the middle class seeks to raise its
socio-economic welfare, it is a basis of political
stability, thus all governments usually consider the
demands of this class, and the majority of political
campaigns also are oriented towards the middle class
to secure its political support (Domanski 1995; 335).
The second common argument is that the mid-
dle class normally provides a stability feature to the
country because of the unwillingness of its mem-
bers to lose their property, and third argument is
based on the assumption that members of the mid-
dle class are involved in the democratic process sim-
ply because they have the time and the money to
participate. This last assumption also has echoes in
democratic theory, which holds that independent
and self-sustaining middle classes create the basis
for democratic civil life. Nevertheless, it cannot be
forgotten that, “the experience of Latin America
and of interwar Lithuania with their vice for au-
thoritarian sentiments showed that civil society ac-
tivity does not always mean strong liberal democ-
racy” (Ðaulauskas 2000; 30).
Here questions about the reasons for such a
dominant pattern arise. For Rutland, part of the
problem is different emphases in defining the
‘middle class’. In general, this term in the United
States denotes a certain standard of living: well-paid
manual workers usually see themselves as ‘middle
class’. In Europe, the definitions tend to be more
political, denoting a certain set of values or
professional background and a sense of distance
from the working class (Rutland 1997; 18). On
closer inspection, it appears that there is no clear
definition of the middle class – different approaches
offer different definitions based on, for example,
profession, power, above-average income,
education, prestige, autonomy, salaried non-manual
work, or high material living standards. Some
segments fulfil one criterion, while some fulfil
others, reflecting the great differentiation within the
class and making analysis even more complicated.
So, statements about the ‘middle class’ and its
relation to democracy are shaped by the selections
authors make from the various definitions and
sections of the class available at any time.
On the other hand, the fact that in almost all
developing democracies the emphasis is placed,
more than anything else, on living standards in
relation to the ‘middle class’, also reflects the
dominant theoretical approach based on United
States society. This particular approach to the issue
has its own strengths and weaknesses. Among its
strengths is the theoretical possibility of finding in
almost all developing democracies, and indeed in
most other societies too, at least some self-
employed and propertied groups of people. This
applies to Malaysia, Taiwan, South Korea, Latin
America countries, and also Iraq (Dawisha 2003;
36). The case of the post-Communist countries,
however, especially in the early years of their
transformation, seems to be an uncomfortable
exception in this regard, lacking a credible middle
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class of any kind (Rona-Tas 1996; 29–44). The main
problem here is the insensitivity on the part of
researchers towards the particularities of the social,
economic and cultural contexts of diverse societies.
Instead a common concept of the ‘middle class’ is
employed across diverse contexts, even though this
concept was developed in societies where
democracy more naturally evolved from middle-
class initiatives and had relatively stable external
conditions almost throughout its development.
The notion of the middle class described above,
when applied across diverse contexts, reveals not
only its own inflexibility but also raises more general
questions about the supposedly positive relationship
between the class and democracy. In relation to this,
Francis Loh in his analysis of Malaysian society
argues that democratic development, “is seriously
limited by the middle class priority of sustained
growth brought about by economic but not political
liberalization” (in Amoroso 2002). Given this,
“having attained identity and lifestyle through
personalized, not social, achievement, individuals
are not inclined to controversial political invol-
vement that can adversely threaten them” (ibid.).
Even in well-established European democracies,
such as France and Austria, election results often
suggest that the middle class see xenophobic
nationalism as a credible political alternative
(Mokrzycki 1995; 223).
In one sense, then, the middle class can be seen
traditionally as a precondition for democracy, in
another, as amenable to authoritarian regimes when
its interests are endangered. As Rutland puts it,
it provides a sufficient level of economic activity,
stability of institutions, and also respect for a
number of norms including decency in the conduct
of economic transactions and the management of
public affairs. But the middle class can also follow
unscrupulous leaders to preserve its need for
security (Rutland 1997; 21).
Moreover, Mokrzycki, writing of the prevailing
discourse about the relation of the middle class and
market-based democracy, notes that:
it is a misunderstanding, resulting from the mixing
up of correlate and cause, that the middle class is
being promoted and stimulated in its development
in order to support market reforms. The middle
class, in all its meanings, even as the petty bour-
geoisie, is just as much a creator of the market as its
product (Mokrzycki 1995; 236).
Thus the middle class, from this point of view,
is a product of the capitalist system and performs
an essential role as a secondary reinforcement of
the system.
These insights, along with an awareness of the
possibilities for the new middle class to foster
democracy, have led some academics to argue that,
“perhaps the term ‘middle class’ is merely a myth
of market democracy, increasingly devoid of
sociological content” (Rutland 1997; 21). The
questionable usefulness of the concept of the middle
class and the disruptive effects of a prevalent
Western theoretical schema can be illustrated with
a more detailed analysis of Central and Eastern
Europe and particularly of current Lithuanian
realities.
The ‘middle class’ approach in a post-
Communist context: the case of Lithuania
Despite the criticisms of the middle-class
approach in Western social science, there have been
many attempts in post-Communist societies to
prove the existence of such a group, or to create it
by means of protectionist laws and policies.
However, in line with a worldwide tendency, the
concept of the middle class is associated more with
property owners (Mokrzycki 1995; 223) than with,
say, technocrats, professionals or white-collar
workers in administration or the service sphere. In
the case of the post-Communist countries, the rea-
son for this identification of the middle class with
property owners, and more specifically self-
employed small traders, may partly be that those
who would more closely resemble the Western ‘new
middle class’ in terms of occupation were paupe-
rised during the neo-liberal reforms carried out by
governments immediately after independence. In
these circumstances, that the idea of fostering the
growth of the middle class justified all programmes
of privatisation and re-privatisation (ibid.) was
hardly surprising.
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The tendency to attribute a middle-class sta-
tus to small traders or even simply to those with
higher incomes is prevailing not only among state
officials but also among large sections of post-Com-
munist society. Various surveys of self-evaluations
of socio-economic status show that the majority of
Lithuanians identify themselves with groups of
lower socio-economic status. Those who locate
themselves further up the social ladder are very few
– less than 1%. Despite the effects of age and edu-
cation differences on the results of these surveys,
the basis of criteria for such self-assessment is mostly
incomes (Tureikytë 1996; 336).
Thus it can be seen that the dominant United-
States notion of the ‘middle class’ as defined by a
certain standard of living has the unexpected
consequence of favouring entrepreneurs rather than
numerous other groups that could form the
dominant new middle class as found in the
developed democracies. Due to the rejection of the
‘third way’ by neo-liberals in favour of the ‘first’,
capitalist way, Central Europe is simulating the
original capitalist cycle of development. Here the
‘knowledge class’ or new middle class is
unimportant in comparison with private property
owners (Mokrzycki 1995; 234).
Nevertheless, paradoxically, the implemen-
tation of favourable laws and privatisation did not
result in the expected tremendous enlargement of
small property owners, at least in Lithuania. At the
end of the first decade of the transformation, the
initial increase in the number of small businesses
has reversed itself, mainly because of the high rate
of bankruptcy. The explanation for this is twofold:
the increased monopolisation and dominance of
large companies as well as the lack of entrepre-
neurial skills and positive attitudes towards them.
According to 1998 statistics, nearly 70% of people
explain their unwillingness to start businesses of
their own by declaring that they do not have the
capacities, or do not know where to start and fear
the financial responsibility (Gruþevskis 2000; 65).
Even if a unified model of the middle class
(based on incomes and political values alike) is em-
ployed in the Lithuanian situation, the empirical
evidence shows up a critically weak middle class
both in terms of a lack of material resources and
vague political attitudes very far from an unquali-
fied support of democracy. Almost all of the sur-
veys agree that according to the level of incomes,
Lithuanian society bears little relation to a middle
class society at all – 16% of the population lives
below the poverty level, while a further 29% is made
up of extremely poor people (Leonavièius 2002; 6).
Even when viewed from the perspective of the most
friendly criterion of higher education, the Lithua-
nian ‘middle class’ is very small – 19% of the work-
ing population (Dargytë-Burokienë 1999; 153).
Such a situation, therefore, has led some research-
ers to conclude that where only the United-States
notion of the ‘middle class’ is employed, then
Lithuanian society in marked contrast with West-
ern states, “does not correspond with the stable
democratic society model” (Taljunaitë 1995; 35).
It is not only the large gap between the well-
off and those with low incomes that serves as an
argument against the existence of a middle class in
post-Communist societies. Another argument deals
with political attitudes, which are not significantly
different between members of the ‘middle class’ and
the rest of the population. If ‘small property owners’
alone are taken into account as the representatives
of a middle class, then most research suggests that
this social group in Central and Eastern Europe has
no sociological makeup as a class, let alone a class
capable of grassroots support for social reforms.
Rather, it is a group devoid of internal coherence,
an ideological platform or political representation.
It is a ‘class’ unable to articulate its interests and
expressing no particular preferences for liberal
values (Mokrzycki 1995; 237).
If, following the ‘new middle class’ definition,
managers and professionals despite their lack of
financial resources are included in middle-class
ranks, then the picture would be quite different,
since these two groups in most post-Communist
countries have more liberal and democratic political
preferences. In a 1999 survey of European values,
managers and professionals were the most likely to
support democracy. They stated that to have a
democratic political system is very positive and that,
while democracy may have its problems, it is better
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than any other form of government. The political
preferences of more routine non-manual employees
and especially those of workers were not nearly so
clearly expressed (Geciene 2004; 492).
Nevertheless, these differences are not so
convincing and preferences differ quite significantly
from one election to another. Some researchers
blame economic and political anomie for the lack
of impact of socio-economic status on voting
behaviour or other political attitudes (Nieuwbeerta
1998; 138–57). Others argue that such a situation is
close to a tendency that has recently gained
prominence in the electoral politics of the advanced
industrial democracies, in which patterns of electo-
ral choice in many new democracies may be based
more on the same short-term factors – candidate
images and issue positions – rather than on class
position (Dalton 1996). However, it seems in
general that the majority of people support
democracy not because they belong to middle-class
ranks but, as in Germany after Nazism, because of
their opposition to the previous regime: they want
“to assure that they would never lose their liberties
to a similar regime again” (Brooke 1997). This
suggests that democracy may not be merely rooted
in long-lasting traditions, but a form of learned
behaviour as well.
It seems that Lithuanian society has certain
defining characteristics separating it from more
typical contemporary middle-class Western so-
cieties. First of all, there is the lack of a wealthy
new middle class and of an established old middle
class supporting democratic values. Nevertheless,
during the first decade of the transformation a
democratic order was fully institutionalised and
support for democracy and the spread of democratic
values became significant. Beyond this, and despite
some sentimentality about the previous life of
relative stability and security, few people now would
welcome the restraints imposed by the former
Communist regime on civil rights and personal
freedoms. It could be said then that the values of
democracy and of a market economy are en-
trenched in the minds of Lithuanian people (Gaidys
2000; 195).
Moreover, younger people are much more pro-
democracy and pro-market, enjoying the newfound
possibilities of studying abroad and the new
prospects of European Union enlargement. As
Vladas Gaidys argues, younger people have
mastered the principles of democracy and civil
society, while one survey shows that they were
socialised in much more democratically favourable
circumstances: of the respondents 70% of 18–29
year-olds (as opposed to just over 30% of 60–74
year-olds) wrote that their families respected their
opinion, while almost 35% of 18–29 year-olds (as
against just under 12% of the older generation) said
that they had the possibility of expressing their
discontent in school and actively used it (Gaidys
2000; 181).
Given this, it does seem that, despite the lack
of a Western-style middle class, Lithuanian society
has some strong potential for sustaining a stable
democracy. A quite analogous situation was found
in an analysis of consumer society in Lithuania.
Actually in the Western tradition a consumer society
is closely related with the middle class because of
the latter’s dependence on the economic status of
the individual. Leonavicius states that despite the
absence of consumer society in Lithuania (mainly
because there are far fewer possibilities to consume)
in comparison with Western models, a very large
part of society (close to 70%) have values and
attitudes which are characteristic of the modern
consumer society: the need for self-expression and
firmly established ecological attitudes (Leonavièius
2002; 15).
In the light of these factors it can be assumed
that the democratic status of Lithuanian society is
best understood not by its middle-class characte-
ristics but by examining its values and attitudes
towards democracy, its past experience of non-
democratic rule and the suppression of civil liberties
and human rights, as well as by the favourable
international context characterised by the spread
of democracy and market economy. This also
applies to, for instance, German democracy, which
was also an effect of external influence (Brooke
1997; 2), while Neil Englehart in his study of new
democracy in Thailand points out that, “although
democratisation in Thailand is often seen as an
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illustration of modernization theory, the extent of
middle class support for democracy is actually
unclear”. He concludes that, “the greatest advance
for Thai democracy in the 1990s was the passage of
the 1997 Constitution, more closely linked to
economic globalisation than modernization” (En-
glehart 2003; 253, 27).
Maybe Lithuanian society, as with many post-
Communist states, develops in a highly particular
way by making an odd jump from non-democratic
processes towards e-democracy, echoing its
previous jump from a pre-modern condition to a
high-tech state without following the more steady
stages of development seen in Western societies?
It may even contain within itself the possibility of
becoming a more vital democratic society, where
the functional counterparts of the Western middle
class are more aware about the development of
democracy than their peers in well-established
democracies? As Glassman notes, writing of the
overwhelming drive among Eastern European
countries towards democracy despite having had
some of the strongest bureaucracies and tools of
social control under Communism: “balancing the
heavy pessimism of Weber and Mills, the recent
events in Eastern Europe have generated a new
optimism about the possibilities for democracy in
the modern world, and the limits of bureaucracy”
(Glassman 1997; 92).
Conclusion
The essential purpose of this essay has been to
ask: what explanatory power does the term ‘middle
class’ (or ‘consumer society’ for that matter) have
in the analysis of post-Communist societies? Does
the term really help us to understand the actual
situation within the rapidly changing societies of the
region, or does it serve only as a powerful metaphor
of their ‘backwardness’ in comparison with Western
ones?
More specifically, as we have seen, when plan-
ning to undertake research on post-Communist so-
cieties, one faces the problem of the use of socio-
logical models. Due to their own orientation to-
wards developed market democracies in the West-
ern world, social researchers from the region have
tended to use typological Western models based on
the characteristics of Western states. What, though,
to paraphrase Leonavièius (Leonavièius 2002; 5),
is the implication of asking about the nature of the
middle class in Lithuania, when the answer is gen-
erally based on characteristics of social behaviour
specifically formulated for Western societies? It is
actually to ask what Lithuania is not by contrast with
Western models: if Lithuanians differ from West-
erners in this regard, it is because they are not on
the proper level in respect to the development of
democracy.
Even between Western sociologists there is
some agreement that traditional Western theories
are not so helpful when it comes to describing
Central and Eastern European realities (Piirainen
1995). Siegrist, for example, has argued that studies
identifying bourgeois and middle class groups in
these areas on the basis of theoretical premises and
European concepts rarely do justice to their subject
matter. According to him, when concepts of the
bourgeoisie or the middle class are imported and
extended to superficially similar phenomena, their
meaning changes significantly (Siegrist 2002; 4).
Comparisons may well show, for example, that
institutional, economic and technical innovations,
which in Western and Central European history are
associated with the bourgeoisie, are planned and
carried out by other actors and groups in those areas
without a bourgeoisie. In such cases, it is not very
helpful to apply the concept of the bourgeoisie to
such groups (ibid.).
To sum up, the difficulties of using the concept
‘middle class’ (or those of ‘consumer society’ or ‘civil
society’, etc.) in the post-Communist world point
to doubts about the advantages of ‘importing’
Western concepts and sociological models to diverse
historical, economic, political and socio-cultural
contexts. If we do use them as purely descriptive
tools for analysing post-Communist social reality,
then it quickly becomes apparent that such
phenomena as the middle class and civil society
hardly exist, at least not in the form they take in
Western countries. To respond in the negative to
the research question ‘Is there a middle class?’ is to
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say nothing about particular social realities or about
the degree of democratic development.
The practice of transferring Western theore-
tical tools to other social contexts is hardly new. We
need only think of the transfer of United States
modernisation theory to explain the ‘backwardness’
of Latin America. The theory and its constituent
elements did not fit these societies precisely because
the theory succeeded only in showing them up as
backward in terms of the modernisation process.
Of course the solution to this ‘problem’ was
subsequently to transfer the values, economic
practices and political principles of the United
States. In this way, scientific concepts paved the way
for ideological, political and economic dominance.
In opposition to these tendencies, there appeared
the dependence theories – Latin American intellec-
tual products based on a close understanding of the
history of the continent. Such theories held out
alternative notions but only as an implicit critique
of modernisation theory. Therefore every resear-
cher must be aware of encoded political values
within theories and concepts of social sciences
(Kraniauskas 2002).
Similarly, the enormous emphasis placed on
the middle class in post-Communist intellectual
discourse makes one aware that this concept is used
not so much as a theoretical tool in explaining social
reality than as an ‘ideological artefact’, as Mokrzycki
notes (Mokrzycki 1995; 232). On the one hand, this
concept may serve as an ideological tool for
legitimising highly particular economic or political
interests and policies. For example, recent debates
on long-term population strategy have revealed a
tendency for state policy to meet middle-class in
terms of a healthy lifestyle, environment, education,
and so on. Here the country’s population strategy
is oriented only towards tiny percentages of the
population and as such erodes the democratic
principle of equal opportunity.
On the other hand, the predominance of a
Western perspective in setting research agendas for
sociological enquiry limits the examination and
understanding of real processes in changing post-
Communist societies. The prevalence of the ‘middle
class’ and certain other Western sociological terms
in intellectual discourse (in politics and the mass
media as well as the academy) has had a profound
impact on research grant and publishing oppor-
tunities, on possibilities to organise conferences or
seminars, and consequently on academic careers.
Other, no less important, topics (for example, the
great expansion of the bureaucracy and the sharp
reduction of popular influence over decision-
making) have been struck from academic and
political agendas. The financial dependence of
social researchers on technical evaluation, a narrow
range of funding bodies and research agendas set
by local and international institutions seriously
restricts the ability of the social sciences to have a
positive influence on decision-making in their res-
pective countries (Etzioni-Halevy 1993; 2).
In conclusion, the common practice of trans-
ferring Western models to the East points towards
the dominance of Western political programmes
in setting research agendas and in attracting spon-
sorship for academic work. It also reveals an ideo-
logical manipulation of theoretical assumptions,
employing otherwise quite artificial models for
the construction of compliant social structures,
or at least presenting a simulacrum of them from
above. Such negative effects simultaneously lead
us to look critically at any direct application of
Western concepts to the post-Communist world
and inspire us to look for more adequate ap-
proaches and theories with which to explain the
social reality of the region. In order to escape the
erroneous use of imported concepts it is more
fruitful, according to the most penetrating post-
Communist accounts of the situation, to analyse
these societies by induction and by the creation
of new conceptions, rather than through a deduc-
tion methodology based on existing theoretical
traditions (Taljunaitë 1999; 13).
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The focus of this article is to reveal some ambi-
guities existing in discourse on middle class, particularly
on causal relationship between the middle class and
democracy, and to show some risk in applying such
Western theoretical framework in post-Communist
context. Therefore, the essential purpose has been to ask:
what explanatory power does the term ‘middle class’ have
in the analysis of post-Communist societies? Does the
term really help us to understand the actual situation
within the rapidly changing societies of the region, or
does it serve only as a powerful metaphor of their
‘backwardness’ in comparison with Western ones?
The practice of transferring Western theoretical
tools to other social contexts is hardly new. We need only
think of the transfer of United States modernisation
theory to explain the ‘backwardness’ of Latin America.
The theory and its constituent elements did not fit these
societies precisely because the theory succeeded only
in showing them up as backward in terms of the
modernisation process. Similarly, if to use the concept
of the middle class as purely descriptive tool for
analysing post-Communist social reality, then it quickly
becomes apparent that such phenomenon as the middle
class hardly exist, at least not in the form it takes in
Western countries. However, such implication says
nothing about particular social realities or about the
degree of democratic development in post-Communist
countries.
The enormous emphasis placed on the middle class
in post-Communist intellectual discourse makes one
aware that this concept is used not so much as a
theoretical tool in explaining social reality than as an
‘ideological artefact’. Therefore, we can speak about signs
of an ideological manipulation of theoretical assumptions,
employing otherwise quite artificial models for the
construction of compliant social structures, or at least
presenting a simulacrum of them from above. Besides,
the common practice of transferring Western models to
the East points towards the dominance of Western
political programmes in setting research agendas and in
attracting sponsorship for academic work. Such negative
effects simultaneously lead us to look critically at any
direct application of Western concepts to the post-
Communist world and inspire us to look for more
adequate approaches and theories with which to explain
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